In Royal Canin USA, Inc. v. Wullschleger (No. 23-677)The Supreme Court has settled a court battle over dog food. Normally, when a plaintiff files a complaint that includes claims under state and federal law, the complaint may be transferred to a federal court, and that court will have jurisdiction to decide all claims. But what happens if, after removal, the plaintiff eliminates the federal causes of action and only the federal causes of action remain? A unanimous court concluded that in this situation, the federal court no longer has jurisdiction over the case, which is now governed exclusively by state law, and that it must be remanded to the state court.
Royal Canin produces a brand of dog food that can only be purchased with a veterinary prescription. This sign of exclusivity makes it possible to charge a premium price. Anastasia Wullschleger purchased some of the food from Royal Canin because she believed the recipe meant the food contained an active ingredient not found in regular dog food. However, when she learned that this was not the case, she sued Royal Canin in Missouri state court, asserting claims under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, state antitrust law, and the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) .
Royal Canin immediately moved the case to federal court based on Wullschleger's federal FDCA claim. Wullschleger countered that move by amending her lawsuit to strike all federal claims and asking the district court to remand the case. The court refused and ultimately dismissed her complaint for failure to assert a claim. Wullschleger then appealed, arguing (among other things) that the district court should never have ruled on the matter since it was obligated to remand the case to state court. The Eighth Circuit agreed, reasoning that the district court's supplementary jurisdiction over the state law claims disappeared with the federal law claims. However, because other appeals courts reached the opposite conclusion—allowing cases to continue in federal court despite the elimination of federal claims—the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
A unanimous court agreed with the Eighth Circuit. Writing for the court, Judge Kagan began by discussing the supplemental venue statute, 28 USC § 1367. In cases where a district court had “original jurisdiction” over a case, Section 1367 also gives the court “supplemental” jurisdiction over all non-federal legal claims that are closely related to the federal claims. That is, when a plaintiff files a lawsuit federal In a court asserting closely related claims under state and federal law, the district court will normally have additional jurisdiction over the claims under state law by virtue of its federal jurisdiction over the claims under federal law. But what if the plaintiff amends the complaint to eliminate the federal claims? In a previous case Rockwell International Corp. v. United States (2007), the court answered this question: “Federal courts need to deal with this.” amended complaintnot the original, when deciding whether they are responsible. So if a plaintiff amends the complaint to eliminate the federal causes of action, the additional jurisdiction over the claims under state law also disappears.
Given Rockwell Internationalthe only debate was whether the rule should be different REMOVED cases than was the case with cases originally filed in federal court. Judge Kagan saw no reason for this: the plain language of Section 1367 makes no distinction between cases originally filed in federal court and cases moved there after being filed in state court. So if the federal judiciary deals with the amended complaint in one context, it should do the same in the other. Kagan also concluded that this approach better fits how amended pleadings affect jurisdiction in a variety of other contexts where courts similarly look only to amended pleadings to resolve jurisdictional issues.
So far, so good. However, the analysis was made significantly more difficult by the inconvenient fact that it included a footnote Rockwell International claimed it was his rule shouldn't apply to remote cases because such cases have “forum manipulation concerns.” While this footnote has “established”.[] “To set exactly the rule that Royal Canin wants,” the court dismissed it as a non-binding dictum. Finally, Rockwell International was a case filed in the Federal Court in the first instance, so it is a speculative commentary on what should happen in such a case REMOVED in federal court was “beyond the point.” The Court's recent practice of not granting primary effect to “drive-by jurisdictional decisions” (i.e., decisions that blithely describe a requirement as “jurisdictional”) applies equally to drive-by jurisdictional footnotes. So while every dog may have his day, that day is in court in Missouri.