If the accused were obliged not to prevent the violation of an agricultural worker, the evidence did not support the fact that they had the last clear chance of avoiding the injuries, but they never focused on reading the approach of North Carolina on the teaching of the camp, they could not express the argument for the first time.
background
Robbie Plyler's leg was caught in a walking grain snail in a grain container, and the resulting injuries required the amputation of his right leg under his knee. The jury found that both Cox Brothers Farms and Plyler were negligent. However, it found that the farm was liable because it and not Plyler had the last clear chance to avoid Plyler's injury.
Individual accused
Cox argues that, since four individual defendants were not present at the place of the cereal container on the day of the injury of Plyler, none of them would have had one last chance to prevent Plyler's injuries. However, the recording shows that the argument for the first time, if only briefly in his post-proceedings, articulated the argument for the first time, if only briefly in his post-procedure for judgment. This Court of Justice cannot say that the district court rejected an application from Cox 'Rule 50 (a) on a basis that the court was only brought to trial after the jury was returned.
Be sufficient
Cox argues that the evidence has not supported that it had the last clear chance of avoiding Plyler's injuries, and that it could therefore not be liable for these injuries under Plyler's negligence theory. However, Cox simply nevertheless never drew the district court's attention to his preferred reading from North Carolina's approach to the doctrine of the last clear chance, and he therefore puts this argument on this argument for the first time in the appeal procedure. This Court refuses to evaluate the evidence submitted in the proceedings against legal theories that have not been submitted below.
Cox does not present any arguments that claim that the evidence of the jury is not supporting the jury about the negligence under the teaching of the last clear chance of how the jury is charged. Therefore, the judgment of the district court, in which COX 'Rule 50 (b) application for the doctrine of the last clear chance of all defendants, is confirmed.
crotch
COX applied for the district court to limit the negotiation to a liability phase and a compensation phase. The district court found that Cox had not presented in favor of the bifurcation, and found that the provision of limiting instructions would “exterminate” the potential of unfair prejudices. COX focuses on the increased risk of a prejudice in the appeal and argues that the introduction of financial data has “raised a real risk that the jury would use information about the defendant's prosperity in an inadequate manner in determining liability and damages”.
In this case, the question of the punishment was submitted to the jury, and “[a] The defendant's financial position is a proper consideration when evaluating the replacement of punishment. “And while the two problems are continued separately at the court's discretion, it also recognized the general effectiveness of the limitation of the instructions.
expert
COX argues that the court made a mistake by admitting “irrelevant and unreliable expert statements” by Plyler's expert, Jeffrey Decker. COX argues that the jury's district court allowed the relevance and reliability of Decker's certificate to be weighed up on the Osha regulations and the Stahl -Sampe door if these are decisions should have been given to the court. The court disagrees.
Decker, as a Farm Safety Expert, admitted a testimony that Cox's measures put into the context of the security regulations set by a government authority, and the district court has properly proven the context of these regulations according to the proof of negligence. The district court has not abused its discretion.
Cox also claims that the district court was wrongly classified because it allowed Decker to say that the steel door, which covered the swamp, was not a sufficient door because it could “roll up” if it could step back on it. As a rule, 703 enables an expert to refer her opinion on “facts or data when the expert has been made aware or observed personally”.
Confirmed.
Plyler v. COX, case No. 24-1445, 24-1488, July 29, 2025. 4. Cir. (Floyd), from WDNC in Charlotte (Whitney). Christopher P. Raab for complainants. John Alexander Heroy for the application. VLW 025-2-290. 25 pp.